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Informal Institutions in Azerbaijan: 
Exploring the Intricacies of Tapsh 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The past twenty years have seen increasingly rapid development in research on informal post-communist economy and 
informal political institutions. While there is no lack in research on informal practices in Russia and other Eastern 
European countries, comprehensive empirical investigations of informality in peripheral regions of the former Soviet 
Union—such as the Caucasus and Central Asia—are still rare. This article fills this gap by providing an evidence-based 
empirical account on informal practices of post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Drawing its empirical data from a two-decade-long 
ethnographic participant observation carried out in various locales of Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, this study is the first 
to offer nuanced insights into the hitherto unexplored in the literature informal practice of tapsh.  
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OVER THE PAST DECADE, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASED interest in the topic of informal 
practices and institutions of post-communist countries. A large and growing body of literature examines the 
use of informal practices in Russia (Ledeneva 1998; 2006; 2013; Lonkila 2010; Michailova & Worm 2003; 
Rose 2000), Ukraine (Onoshchenko & Williams 2013; Polese 2008; Round et al. 2008), Central Asia 
(Radnitz et al. 2009; Rasanayagam 2011; Oka 2013) and non-Soviet former Socialist countries (Kim 2005; 
Miller et al. 1997; Rose et al. 1997; Sneath 2006; Sik 1994). While extensive research has been carried out 
on such well-known informal practices such as Chinese guanxi, Arab wasta or Russian blat, there is a 
general lack of studies on specific informal practices of the South Caucasus’s societies. More general 
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studies on informal relations of the South Caucasus’s societies have been published by Di Puppo (2010), 
Timm (2012), Stefes (2008) and Babajanian (2008). Previous studies on informality in Azerbaijan have 
focused on informal political institutions (Safiyev 2013), social capital (Hasanov 2009), kinship networks 
(Aliyev 2014a), informal market relations (Yalçın-Heckmann 2014), and the use of informal channels in 
welfare provision (Sayfutdinova 2015).  
Nevertheless, the academic understanding of specific informal behaviours, such as the widespread 
informal practice known under the term ‘tapsh’, which has been thriving in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku since 
the early Soviet period, remains limited. Widespread and often indispensable for the population of 
Azerbaijan for generations, the practice of tapsh remained virtually unknown to outsiders for decades. A 
simple search in ‘Google Scholar’ for the term ‘tapsh’ would suffice to reveal that not a single study has 
thus far focused on the phenomenon of Azerbaijan’s tapsh. With the empirical focus on the use of tapsh in 
the education sector and at the job market, the findings of this study demonstrate that––sustained and 
reinforced by problems of post-communism––tapsh is thriving in both public and private spheres of 
Azerbaijan.      
This article seeks to shed some light on what Azerbaijan’s informal practice of tapsh is and how it 
manifests itself in highly informalised education and employment sectors. Along with the primary 
empirical focus on the use of tapsh in higher education and in search for jobs, this study also aims to 
answer a number of broader questions crucial for the understanding of the role of tapsh in the contemporary 
Azerbaijan, as well as its emergence and functioning. What is the socio-political and socio-economic 
significance of tapsh? How does tapsh compare to other informal practices in the post-Soviet region? What 
has changed since the end of the Soviet rule as far as the extent and practice of tapsh concerned?  
To address these questions, this study pursues both theoretical and empirical objectives. 
Theoretically, this article presents tapsh as functionally and structurally similar to other informal practices 
flourishing in different parts of the world. It is argued in this study that, despite the cultural embedding of 
tapsh, which makes it intrinsic to Azerbaijan and distinguishes it from informal behaviours in other 
countries, tapsh is not unique. Its triadic, reciprocal and ambivalent nature enables classifying tapsh as part 
of the ‘larger family’ of informal practices. The key theoretical argument of this study is that Azerbaijan’s 
tapsh is functionally and operationally synonymous with informal practices of other post-communist 
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societies, which enables this empirical investigation of tapsh to contribute towards broader research on 
post-communist informal institutions. Empirically based on extensive multi-stage ethnographic fieldwork, 
this article offers an exclusive insight into the shadowy and little known outside of Azerbaijan practice of 
tapsh, which, as revealed by this study, functions as a complex and, at times, indispensable social 
mechanism omnipresent in urban settings of Baku and other major Azerbaijani cities. 
This article incorporates empirical data from long-standing ethnographic fieldwork carried out by the 
author in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku during the late 1990s (1998–1999), mid 2000s (2005–2007), and more 
recently between 2013 and 2014. The main method employed to collect qualitative ethnographic data is 
participant and field observation. The method was centred both on first-hand witness experience of 
informal practices in action and on hundreds of mostly unrecorded informal unstructured interviews. Many 
of these interviews, which were carried out with a wide range of informants, representing different age 
groups, gender, occupations, social class and originating from both urban and rural settlements of various 
regions of Azerbaijan.1, occurred as casual conversations. This ethnographic observation covers 
representatives of several ethnic groups, including the Azeri majority and ethnic Russian minority, as well 
as Lezgins and Baku’s Jews originating from different parts of Azerbaijan. However, over 90% of 
informants were permanent residents of Baku, and were either born in the capital or moved to Baku from 
other parts of the country. The bulk of field observation research was carried out either in Baku’s 
downtown district or in the vast south-western district of Khatai. While interviews covered a wide range of 
topics about the use of tapsh, the key observation points were the use of tapsh in education and at the job 
market. Main observation places were state and private universities.  
Given that most Azerbaijanis are initially reluctant to talk about tapsh and, even more so, to admit 
using it, the data collection process required building trust-based relationships between the researcher and 
informants. Due to the random and unstructured character of interviews, this study does not pursue 
presenting a statistically representative sample. Rather, the main goal of this research is to provide 
systematic qualitative evidence collected from participant observation of ‘common people’, representing 
various segments of population. Regardless of the lack of statistical representativeness of this sample, yet 
                                                 
1 Most interviews carried out during the third stage of fieldwork (2013–2014) were digitally recorded.  
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owing to its focus on a variety of informants of different age, gender and occupational strata, it represents 
the views and opinions commonly held by the plurality of Baku’s population. The use of qualitative 
ethnographic observation is not uncommon in research on post-communist informal practices (Ledeneva 
1998; Polese 2008), as it allows the researchers to uncover social behaviour that is not easily notable by an 
outsider and cannot be accurately encoded by representative surveys.   
 
Theoretical Framework: Extended ‘family’ of informal practices 
This study of Azerbaijani tapsh—through its context-based analysis of Azeri informal practices’ 
characteristics—seeks to demonstrate functional and structural convergences of post-communist informal 
practices. With regard to its theoretical foundation, this study follows those scholars of informality who 
have proposed that informal practices of different societies, notwithstanding their differences, share 
common characteristics, such as their functions of private safety nets and their general use of 
circumventing formal bureaucracy (Rose et al. 1997; Ledeneva 1998; Misztal 2000; Smith et al. 2012). 
Although the practice of using informal networks and connections to receive preferential access to 
public goods and services dates back to the early periods of modernisation and industrialisation (Castells 
2011; Misztal 2000), human societies relied on informal practices since the dawn of mankind (Mauss 
1967). In different societies and countries, informal practices are known under various names. A 
considerable amount of literature has been published on Chinese informal practice of guanxi 
(‘connections’) (Gold et al. 2002; Yang 1994), which, as argued by Gold et al. (2004, p. 1) ‘is absolutely 
essential to successfully complete any task in virtually all spheres of social life’, not only in mainland 
China but also in Taiwan and amongst Chinese immigrant communities in different parts of the world 
(Hutchings & Murray 2002). Much less known in academic studies is the Korean equivalent of guanxi––
gwangye (‘connections’ or ‘contacts’), which, similarly to guanxi, manifests itself in nearly all areas of 
public and private life on both parts of the Korean peninsula. While the research on guanxi has occupied 
the central part in studies of informal practices for decades, an increasing amount of literature has appeared 
in recent years on the informal practice of wasta (‘going in between’), endemic to the Arab world (Al-
Ramahi 2008; Barnett et al. 2013; Hutchings & Weir 2006). Wasta, defined as a ‘personal exchange system 
between members of society’ (Al-Ramahi, 2008, p. 36), in Hutchings and Weir’s (2006, p. 278) 
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explanation, ‘pervades the culture of all Arab countries and is a force in all significant decision making’. In 
Brazil, informal practices, functioning as social safety nets and problem-solving mechanisms and granting 
access to public goods, are known under the term jeitinho (‘little way’) and are ‘widely recognized and 
practiced through Brazilian contemporary society’ (Ferreira et al. 2012, p. 332). Similarly well-known are 
the Mexican palanca (Daymon & Hodges 2009), and numerous other informal practices of different Latin 
American countries (Lomnitz 1971; Portes 2003).  
Former socialist societies, which remained hidden from the eyes of researchers until the fall of state 
communism in the late 1980s, have also developed complex and deeply-rooted in social culture traditions 
of informality. Recent research on informal practices in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe 
revealed that such practices as Polish zalatwic´ sprawy (Butler 1995), Bulgarian blizki (‘relations’) and 
vruzki (‘connections’) (Begg & Pickles 1998; Chavdarova 2013), as well as various informal practices of 
other former socialist European societies (Grødeland 2007), have successfully survived the collapse of state 
communism, and even continued to prosper after the accession of these countries to the European Union 
(Grødeland & Aasland 2011).  
Although not much is known about specific informal practices of post-Soviet societies in peripheral 
regions of the former Soviet Union, such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, there is a large volume of 
published studies describing the Russian-Soviet practice of blat. The leading expert on blat, Alena 
Ledeneva (2013, p. 7) defines blat as ‘the use of personal networks for obtaining goods and services in 
short supply and for circumventing formal procedures’. Pioneered by Ledeneva (1998), the research on blat 
now consists of numerous studies (Michailova & Worm 2003; Lonkila 2010), which present blat as a 
complex and highly adaptive informal practice flourishing not only across the vast expanse of Russian 
Federation, but also in Ukraine (Onoshechneko & Williams 2013), Kazakhstan (Oka 2013), Uzbekistan 
(Rasanayagam 2011) and the South Caucasus (Aliyev 2013). 
Rather than being confined to the developing world, informal practices—though on a much smaller 
scale—also exist in developed capitalist societies. For instance, the British practice of ‘pulling strings’ and 
the ‘old boys’ networks in Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand are typical examples of 
informal practices used in developed countries. The French term piston and the Israeli protetzia, are used to 
describe clientelist informal practices employed to circumvent formal institutions and procedures.  
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Notwithstanding this diversity of informal practices, all of the above informal behaviours perform 
similar functions. According to Smith et al. (2012, p. 345), who compared guanxi, wasta, jeitinho, blat and 
‘pulling strings’, the ‘informal influence varies between nations more in amount than in its specific 
qualities’. Regardless of differences in the scope of their spread and their importance within the society, the 
main purpose of each of these practices is to circumvent formal rules and provide their beneficiaries with 
selectively redistributed favours and services. Most of these informal practices are structurally organised 
into informal networks (Lomnitz 1988). Nearly all informal behaviours are functionally ambivalent and 
tend to occupy a ‘grey’ zone between informality and illegality. Each of these informal behaviours not only 
employs morally appropriate functions of private safety nets, but also actively engages in corrupt, 
nepotistic and even criminal practices. This has led many scholars of informal practices to suggest that 
informal structures are neither positive nor negative (Ledeneva 1998; Polese 2008; Grødeland & Aasland 
2011; Yang 1994). Bearing in mind these inherent similarities of informal practices, this study presents 
Azerbaijani tapsh not as a unique informal practice, but as a part of a ‘larger family’ of informal behaviours 
currently existing in different parts of the world. 
 
What is tapsh? 
Tapsh is an informal practice—intrinsic to the post-Soviet republic of Azerbaijan—based on the provision 
of informally and selectively redistributed services, favours and other forms of informal assistance, offered 
via clientelistic channels to family, friendship, professional connections and contacts. Most informants 
equivocally described tapsh as a service granting preferential access to resources, which otherwise remain 
unavailable due to bureaucratic challenges, corruption, or nepotism. In some cases, tapsh enables access to 
services, such as assistance in obtaining construction permits or land-ownership deals, irrespectively of 
whether individuals seeking access to such resources are formally or legally entitled to receive them. Tapsh 
is widely employed to obtain preferential treatment in different types of formal institutions and it is 
particularly omnipresent across the education sector and the job market. 
 The term ‘tapsh’ originates from Azerbaijani verb ‘tapşırmaq’ (or noun tapşıriq ‘assignment’), 
which translates into English as ‘to assign’ or ‘to authorise.’ The use of the term tapsh, as well as the 
complete understanding of its functions, is geographically limited to the capital Baku and neighbouring 
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Sumgayit city, the third largest city of Azerbaijan. Although informants from Ganja, the second largest city 
of the country, were familiar with the term tapsh, they nonetheless preferred using synonymous terms of 
‘hormet’ (‘favour’) or ‘adamimiz’ (‘people of the circle’). The majority of informants from rural 
settlements, particularly the areas located outside of the region of Absheron (a region which includes 
Baku), were either unfamiliar with the term tapsh or were more inclined on using the term ‘hormet’ instead. 
Nevertheless, all permanent and long-term residents of Baku are well acquainted with the term tapsh. 
During the Soviet period, tapsh was linguistically Russified. In the Russian language, the use of tapsh-
favours is referred to as tapshanut`sya (or ‘to make use’ of tapsh), or tapshevat` (‘to provide’ tapsh for 
someone). Despite being extensively used by both Russian-speaking Azeri and ethnic Russians in 
Azerbaijan, the term tapsh is a typical Azeri phenomenon, unknown and unheard of in Russia or other 
former Soviet republics. The mystery that surrounds the phenomenon of tapsh, as well as the complete lack 
of research on tapsh, persists largely because Azerbaijanis, similarly to beneficiaries of informal practices 
in other countries, rarely talk about tapsh, not only to outsiders but also among themselves. The unwritten 
rules of tapsh, similarly to those of other informal practices, are both informally codified and self-
interpreted. The mystery that surrounds the phenomenon of tapsh, as well as the complete absence of 
research on tapsh, is largely because Azerbaijanis rarely talk about tapsh not only to outsiders but also 
amongst themselves.  
Tapsh is primarily a triadic relationship involving a favour-seeker, favour-provider and a guarantor. 
Guarantor serves as an intermediary who employs his or her personal influence, status or position within 
the society in order to persuade favour-provider to offer tapsh-favours to the guarantor’s family members 
or friends. Hence, tapsh transactions and, particularly, the intermediary who makes them possible, are used 
as a bridge, or a weak tie, connecting two strong tie networks and allowing them to re-distribute services 
and public goods available within one network yet inaccessible for members of other networks 
(Granovetter 1973). It is not uncommon for tapsh to involve a number of individuals, creating a ‘chain’ 
relationship where Person A employs his or her connections requesting them in turn to use their networks 
in order to secure a favour for Person B, who might be a friend or a distant relative of A. As explained by a 
graduate student at a Baku university: ‘I had to get some important papers signed by the rector, and my dad 
had a friend who knew someone related [by blood] to the rector. So, my dad, asked his friend to do a favour 
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for him persuading the rector’s relative into asking rector to sign this document for me’2. Although many of 
tapsh ‘transactions’ involve more than two participants, cases of preferential treatment provided to one 
family member by another are not unique. One typical example of dyadic tapsh is when an individual is 
being employed by his or her family member regardless of the existence of more qualified but unrelated to 
the employer candidates.  
Often tapsh is provided in return for a favour or as a sign of gratitude. Then it acquires a reciprocal 
character. While reciprocity is not a necessary component of tapsh practices, ‘doing good’ by offering 
preferential treatment to ‘pay back’ for one’s help is widely practiced. A number of informants confirmed 
that they did ‘favours’ to the individuals who previously provided them with tapsh-favours. In the words of 
a doctor: ‘a friend of mine helped my son to get a good job, so whenever she needs medical services, I 
make sure that she receives all the necessary [medical] treatment in our hospital for free’3. Although the 
element of reciprocity in tapsh-relations often becomes overshadowed by other variables, such as 
hierarchy, even the most hierarchical and clientelistic of tapsh-transactions still retain some sort of 
reciprocity. A junior lecturer at a Baku university said the following: ‘I am often being asked by [my] 
superiors to give certain students, who have tapsh, good grades. When I once approached one of my 
superiors to tapsh my nephew in getting admitted to the university, he helped me eagerly’4. As seen from 
this example, even in top-down hierarchical type of relations, reciprocity is still present: if the lecturer’s 
supervisor refused to help her—regardless of the existing hierarchy—she would be unwilling to do favours 
for him.  
The effectiveness and pervasiveness of tapsh depend on the strength and importance of one’s 
connections, contacts, acquaintances and family links. As engrained in the Russian proverb ‘ne imei sta 
rublei a imei sto druzei’—literally translated as ‘having hundred friends is more important than having 
hundred roubles’—the role of connections is fundamental in one’s reliance on tapsh. Since tapsh-favours 
are often, although not always, distributed as a sign of respect, as an acknowledgement of a relationship—
such as based on family, kinship or friendship links, or on professional hierarchy and superiority—desire to 
                                                 
2 Conversation with a graduate student, Baku, November 1999.  
3 Conversation with a doctor, Baku, August 2006.  
4 Conversation with a university lecturer, Baku, 1999.  
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please, or a necessity to obey one’s orders, the value and importance of such favours, first of all, depend on 
the nature of personal relationship between tapsh providers and their beneficiaries. This means that 
sometimes tapsh is hierarchical. For example, tapsh relations are hierarchical when providers of access are 
obliged to offer a service either following orders of superiors or as a sign of respect to someone more 
influential and powerful than they are. Some informants, who relied on tapsh in order to receive good 
grades, admitted that lecturers had given them top grades because they were told to do so by their 
superiors.5 Although the element of hierarchy is present in many tapsh relations, hierarchy is not always 
and necessarily present. Numerous informants agreed that they provide tapsh-favours not because they 
have to, but because they feel moral obligation to do so, or they are driven by a sense of gratitude or 
appreciation. For instance, a university lecturer in Baku explained that she often gives good grades to 
students whose parents, or other family members, are employed at the same university, even if she is not 
asked to do so by either students or their parents. In words of that informant, ‘I just feel professional 
obligation to “help” these kids. I know that their parents would do the same for my children’6. In this case, 
the informant offers preferential treatment to some of her students not following requests from her 
superiors or colleagues, but because she thinks it is a good manner. This also shows that, similar to other 
post-communist informal practices (Smith & Stenning 2006; Rasanayagam 2011), tapsh is deeply 
embedded in social culture. Due to this power of non-codified constraints, tapsh bears some similarity to 
guanxi code that is more formal and ceremonial than informal practices like blat would imply (Ledeneva 
2008). The code of honour and the loss of face, incorporated into tapsh also make it similar to wasta (Al-
Ramahi 2008). 
For Azerbaijanis, tapsh is neither positive nor negative. The perception of tapsh, as well as the 
perception of corruption, in Azerbaijan and in many parts of the former Soviet Union (Morris & Polese 
2014; Polese 2014; Wanner 2005), depends on the context in which such practices are employed. A Baku 
resident stated: ‘of course, when I have [good] tapsh, I do not complain. I will use it [tapsh] eagerly. Yet, 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, hierarchy in tapsh relations does not exclude reciprocity and superiors also have to provide 
tapsh-favours to their subordinates.  
6 Conversation with a university lecturer, Baku, 1998. 
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when someone else has ‘stronger’ tapsh, I think that it is normal. There is nothing unfair about that’7. On 
more than one occasion, different informants admitted that if not for tapsh they would have had difficulties 
receiving their degrees, finding jobs or obtaining formal papers. A recent university graduate in Baku 
noted: ‘if I did not rely on tapsh, I would have to spend a lot of time studying subjects which were largely 
irrelevant to my career’8. While there was a general sense of agreement among informants that life without 
tapsh could be easier, many have thought that if they could no longer employ their connections, they would 
either have to pay bribes or formal fees. Both the former and the latter would incur considerably higher 
financial costs than using tapsh. This leads us towards the ambiguous relationship between tapsh and 
corruption. 
 
Tapsh and Corruption 
A thin red line between tapsh practices and corruption lies in the intrinsic characteristic of tapsh as an 
access-granting service. As observed by a Baku resident: ‘tapsh is a non-monetary corruption’. However, 
tapsh is neither a substitute nor an equivalent for corruption. Given that building and maintaining inter-
personal networks are more time-consuming and difficult than paying bribes, tapsh is commonly 
understood as superior to corruption. Unlike corruption, which remains omnipresent among both street-
level bureaucrats (Morris & Polese 2014) and high ranking government officials, tapsh grants access to 
public goods and services which cannot always be bought for bribes (Rivkin-Fish 2005). A Baku resident, 
who was employed in wholesale trade, explained: 
 
If you want to get a favour from a high ranking official in a ministry, you cannot simply walk 
into that person’s office and put envelop [with money] on his desk. [in that case] … you will 
be immediately escorted by security guards …. What you need to do is to find someone who 
can “recommend” [tapsh] you to that official … it is only then that you can ask [official] for a 
favour and reciprocate with a valuable gift. So, that no money changes hands.9   
                                                 
7 Conversation with a Baku resident, Baku, February 2007.  
8 Conversation with a Baku resident, Baku, September 2006.  
9 Conversation with an entrepreneur, Baku, June 2006.  
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In other cases, tapsh is needed in order to gain trust of an official or a business partner. Based on that 
trust-bound relationship, favour-seeker may offer bribes or material gifts to favour-provider, in case if there 
are no other means of reciprocating for services. Tapsh is generally preferred over bribery due to its ‘safe’ 
and relatively ‘clean’ nature. Unlike bribery, tapsh is not illegal. A public servant who worked at a health 
clinic in Baku emphasised: ‘I never took bribes… neither during Soviet period, nor afterwards. However, I 
do not object tapsh, because it is different. There is nothing wrong about having connections with good 
people and using these connections when there is no other way [of getting things done].’10  
If to a Western eye, informality in post-Soviet spaces is corrupt and nepotistic (Giordano & Hayoz 
2013), post-Soviet citizens perceive informal practices as coping mechanisms and private safety nets, 
employed in daily life, fostered and valued. As findings of this research reveal, multiple officials and 
businessmen in Baku favour tapsh over bribery, not only because the former is ‘safer’ and more morally 
appropriate, but also because it enables them expanding their personal networks and acquiring new 
contacts. An office manager of a small local company stated that he is ‘… not afraid to use connections and 
tapsh, because these are not bribes and nobody can say that I am doing anything wrong, because everyone 
does that!’11 Another informant, who worked at a state hospital in Baku, pointed out that a person who 
refuses to engage in exchange of tapsh-favours may appear abnormal to others and if people realise that 
tapsh does not work with that person, they may start offering bribes. 
Tapsh is widely employed as a means of brokerage for corruption, but tapsh relations are not purely 
monetary transactions; they are services of access. Following the unwritten rules, individuals receiving 
tapsh-favours will chose to reciprocate either (and preferably) with a similar favour or—in case if the 
exchange of favours is not possible—with a material gift. This means that money may be substituted with a 
favour of similar importance or a material non-monetary gift. Similarly to other informal practices, tapsh 
bears many characteristics of corruption and bribery (Parry & Bloch 1989; Polese 2014). Nevertheless, as 
tapsh transactions do not involve money changing hands, it would be erroneous to classify tapsh as a form 
of corruption. In contrast to individuals engaged in systematic corruption, people relying on tapsh are not 
                                                 
10 Conversation with a retired public servant, Baku, December 2006.  
11 Conversation with a private sector employee, Baku, March 2007.  
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necessarily seen as ‘corrupt.’ Because tapsh-favours occur not only between the population and public 
officials, but also among people from all walks of life, tapsh differs from nepotism and favouritism. Unlike 
nepotism, tapsh-practices function as reciprocal exchanges between equals, similar to mutually beneficial 
exchanges in blat (Ledeneva 1998) and guanxi (Yang 1994). The reciprocal characteristics of tapsh also 
distinguish it from clientelism and patronage. While in some cases tapsh transactions may involve elements 
of clientelism—for instance patron-client hierarchy—in other cases favours may be distributed without the 
‘pressure from above’.  
 
Tapsh and Politics 
Tapsh is primarily a socioeconomic phenomenon that manifests itself in many aspects of daily life and 
functions as an important private safety net in such areas as assistance at the job market, knowledge and 
expertise sharing, as well as the distribution of various services of access. Hence, tapsh performs numerous 
socio-economic functions and therefore can be characterised—similarly to most other post-communist 
informal practices—as an essentially socio-economic informal institution. Notwithstanding tapsh’s strong 
socio-economic character, tapsh-favours also trickle down into the socio-political sphere. With regard to 
tapsh’s function of offering individuals’ preferential treatment in state institutions, tapsh serves as a bridge 
between elected or appointed public officials and the population. Bearing in mind that access to some 
public services, such as register offices, customs services and the Prosecutor General’s office, requires 
more than basic friendship connections, which otherwise would be sufficient to obtain a simple service of 
access in public institutions, reaching out to higher echelons of political establishment secures higher 
quality tapsh. Access to high ranking officials is of particular importance for businessmen and 
entrepreneurs who have to deal with state officials on a frequent basis. Obtaining land registers, tax 
clearances, all sorts of permits and other official documents in Azerbaijan requires not only paying bribes, 
but also establishing informal ‘work relationship’ with the people in power.  
This favour-based relationship between private entrepreneurs and public officials requires market 
actors to engage in network building with ruling elites. As explained by an owner of a medium-sized 
business in Baku, having connections with political elites is ‘always good for business’ because high level 
tapsh ‘makes all official processes fast and easy.’ As the value of tapsh increases, so does the challenge of 
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securing access to elite tapsh-providers. Another businessman detailed that ‘getting close to high-ranking 
officials involves treating them banquets [qonaqliq] and making expensive gifts’12, but it is a ‘worth 
investment’ into one’s business. One’s ability to receive tapsh from top-ranking state officials is a high 
privilege that would ensure rapid access to various administrative services, which otherwise require longer 
waiting time or higher informal payments. 
Unlike tapsh-transactions between businessmen and public officials, where the former are 
commonly able to repay for the latter’s services with material gifts, tapsh-relationships in politics easily 
acquire top-down patronal characteristics. As informal favours become distributed among politicians, they 
are neither described by the term tapsh nor retain typical features of tapsh, such as functions of safety nets 
and the right of access (Tokluoglu 2012). The highly hierarchical nature of Azerbaijan’s politics determines 
that the distribution of reciprocal favours is of little value in an environment dominated by vertical 
patronage relationships (Safiyev 2013). Unlike business-state relations, where hierarchy is combined with 
some sort of reciprocity, relationships within the ruling elite are based on strict subordination to the centre, 
which in its turn distributes resources and orders to lower tiers of hierarchy. This rigidly hierarchical 
structure leaves little room for any other informal institutions except patron-client relations. In contrast to 
patronage institutions, tapsh is ambivalent in its functions: sometimes it assumes elements of patronage, 
other times it exists as reciprocal relations or functions as brokerage. This lack of clearly designated 
functionality is another characteristic of tapsh that firmly places it into a broader category of post-
communist informal practices. Yet how different is tapsh from other post-communist informal practices? 
 
Tapsh and Other Post-Soviet Informal Institutions 
The key characteristics of Soviet-era and the early post-communist blat was its emphasis on reciprocity of 
favours—dubbed by Ledeneva (1998) as an ‘economy of favours’—its non-hierarchical nature and main 
function of procuring material goods in short supply and preferential treatment in formal institutions. In 
later periods, owing to improvements in economic well-being of the population and belated transition to 
market economy, blat has lost its function of procuring commodities (Ledeneva 2009, p. 206-210). The 
                                                 
12 Conversation with a business-owner, Baku, August 2005.  
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reciprocity of favours was also no longer a must, and hierarchical relations began occupying a central part 
in blat-based transactions.  
In contrast to blat, tapsh was rarely used to obtain commodities. Even during the Soviet period, 
tapsh was primarily employed to access formal institutions and circumvent bureaucracy, rather than to 
purchase deficit goods. Tapsh, similar to blat, also retains some elements of reciprocity, which, unlike 
reciprocal exchanges of favours in blat practices, was never central to the functioning of tapsh. In contrast 
to the communist-era blat, tapsh was always hierarchical and clientelistic, and reciprocity, though present, 
was of secondary importance. However, two and a half decades of post-communist socio-political and 
socio-economic transformation eradicated most fundamental differences between the two practices and the 
functions of present-day Russian blat are hardly distinguishable from those of Azerbaijani tapsh.  
The main difference remains in perception. In contrast to Georgia, where the term blat remains 
largely unknown (Aliyev 2014b, p. 25; Altman 1983, p. 6-1), blat is well-known in the urban milieu of 
Azerbaijan and the majority of informants appeared familiar with the term. Whereas the younger post-
communist generation of Azerbaijanis––with the exception of Russian-speaking natives of Baku––either 
never heard of blat, or found it difficult to explain its meaning, the predominant majority of respondents 
with at least a decade of life-experience under communism were intimately familiar with the term blat. 
Noteworthy is that informants familiar with the meaning of blat insisted on differentiating it from tapsh, 
because the term blat in Azerbaijan, as stated by an informant ‘is, first of all, a part of street slang or a 
criminal jargon used to refer to one’s social standing or status within a group of friends or mahalla [urban 
community]’13. In contrast, the term tapsh refers to specific informal practices seen by the population as 
normal and even trivial. This shows that although the concept of blat survives in post-Soviet Azerbaijan—
mainly as a Soviet legacy—it is understood differently from blat in Russia or Ukraine. A number of 
informants, who previously lived and worked in different parts of Russia, claimed that Russian blat, or its 
Azeri equivalent, and tapsh are not the same thing. In the words of an informant, who due to business 
interests spends considerable time in Russia: 
  
                                                 
13 Conversation with a Baku resident, Baku, October 2006. 
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If I am asked by my [Russian] friends to do someone favour po znakomstvu [using connections] … 
This is what you would call blat … I may or may not do it. It depends on circumstances. And, if I 
do not do it; it is OK. I can do it next time. In Azerbaijan, if I am asked to tapsh someone, 
particularly if the request comes from a relative, I must do it. It is a matter of honour, of prestige. 
There is no way of refusing. That person will never talk to me again [in case of refusal].14  
 
This example demonstrates that in contrast to blat, which ‘is normally a relation of equal parties’ 
(Ledeneva 1998, p. 53), tapsh is deeply embedded in individual and family honour. Hence, unlike blat, 
engaging in tapsh-based relations is often an obligation that has to be fulfilled regardless of individuals’ 
choice. This makes tapsh somewhat more pervasive and effective than blat. 
Much less pronounced are the distinctions between Azerbaijan’s tapsh and informal practices of 
other ethnic groups in the Caucasus and Central Asia. For example, Georgian informal practice krtami 
(Aliyev 2014b), similarly to tapsh is highly ambivalent and employed as both a private safety net and a 
mechanism of circumventing formal bureaucracy. Krtami—often translated as ‘bribe’—combines the use 
of informal connections and networks with distribution of material gifts and the provision of access 
services. One major similarity between tapsh and krtami is that both informal practices are deeply 
embedded into socio-cultural traditions of the South Caucasus’s ethnic groups. This means that hierarchical 
kinship and extended family relations are as crucial for Georgians as they are for Azeris. While krtami is an 
example of synonymous with tapsh informal practices in the South Caucasus region, Kazakhstan’s para-
exchanges, witnessed by Werner (2002), present a symbiosis of informal networking and exchanges of 
informal payments and gifts for access to state institutions. Given that just like tapsh, para and krtami 
expanded and proliferated during the communist period, a clue towards understanding differences and 
similarities between tapsh and other post-Soviet informal practices, such as blat, may lie in unravelling the 
historical origins of tapsh.     
 
Tapsh: A Soviet Phenomenon? 
                                                 
14 Informal conversation with a businessman, Baku, March, 2007.  
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The origins of tapsh are shrouded in mystery. With no research carried out so far, it seems impossible to 
trace back the roots of the phenomenon. The findings of this study illustrate that tapsh was thriving 
throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. A retired healthcare sector employee in her early 70s reminisced 
that tapsh existed as long as she can remember herself. As her parents—who were of pre-Bolshevik 
generation and were not using the term instead describing such relations as tanışlıq (‘connections’)—she 
was certain that tapsh-practices reached their prime during the 1940s. In the words of a pensioner, who had 
a career in communist administration of Soviet Azerbaijan, ‘[e]verything was difficult in post-war [World 
War II] years, and we only survived because we had families and friends to rely on. Connections and 
networks meant everything’15. Although he stated that the term tapsh became firmly fixed in Baku’s urban 
slang only during the 1960s, the informant was confident that practices described under the term tapsh 
flourished since the post-WWII period. 
A more nuanced analysis of Azerbaijan’s social milieu under Soviet rule reveals that owing to 
chronic shortages of consumer goods and food items, the reliance on ‘connections’ (tanışlıq) was more 
essential than circumvention of formal bureaucracy. The communist elites of Azerbaijan, as well as of other 
indigenous republics, were frequently purged during Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s periods and, despite the 
growing importance of local elite-networks, were still firmly under the iron fist of Kremlin (Beissinger 
2002). It is during the period of Brezhnev’s stasis (zastoi) that Soviet administrations of Azerbaijan became 
mired in chronic corruption and clientelism which pervaded all areas of public administration (Aliyev 2015, 
p. 63-65). Doing things through tapsh became norm-of-the-day in Soviet Azerbaijan not only for 
communist elites, but also for common citizens who struggled to circumvent formal bureaucracy and 
corruption, and, therefore, employed tapsh extensively in their daily lives.   
Sometimes tapsh was used to expedite formal procedures. In the words of a witness: ‘it could take 
forever to get anything done if you had to deal with [Soviet] authorities in Baku. Even to call a plumber, 
you had to wait for weeks, unless you have connections and you know “necessary people”’16. More often 
tapsh was used to receive access to public goods and services. Though all Soviet citizens were entitled to 
free education and healthcare, the access to, and, particularly, the quality of services heavily depended on 
                                                 
15 Conversation with a retired Baku resident, Baku, 1998.   
16 Conversation with a Baku resident, Baku, 2000. 
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the leverage of individuals’ tapsh. An elderly informant, who spend most of her life under the Soviet rule, 
lamented that in Soviet times ‘it was nearly impossible to get admission to a good doctor unless you had 
tapsh. Even if you try to approach that person [with a bribe], they could refuse it, they did not even take 
gifts [of access] without tapsh’17. A similar situation was described by a former public servant: ‘all people 
in our administration were tapshevannyie [appointed through tapsh], it was literally impossible to get a job 
in a government or [communist] party administration without tapsh’. Another informant of similar age and 
social background added that ‘party membership and Marxist-Leninist ideology were totally irrelevant for 
your access to good [party] jobs. All that mattered is your family connections’18. 
Tapsh was not only an inseparable––although well-disguised––element of Azerbaijani communism, 
but it also helped to undermine the communist party’s credibility and legitimacy. In statement of an 
informant who studied in a Baku university during the 1960s: ‘[w]e almost always used tapsh to pass 
classes on Marxism-Leninism. We all knew that these classes were nonsense and we did not want to waste 
our time on studying it’19. A former academic explained that: 
 
[in Soviet times] … tapsh in higher education, due to the absence of specialists, led to the 
“extinction” of certain academic disciplines … there was no one to teach some subjects [such as 
history of communist party or the principles of Leninism] because nobody studied them … 
everyone passed their exams with tapsh … so they [communist authorities] had to bring in lecturers 
from Russia.20   
 
Apart from tapsh’s pernicious effects on communist ideological education, because of the use of 
tapsh in higher education, many of Azerbaijan’s technical industries desperately lacked experts and 
educated professionals. As mentioned by a former factory administrator from Baku: ‘[w]e never had 
enough knowledgeable professionals, because university graduates were usually lacking proper education 
                                                 
17 Conversation with an elderly Baku resident, Baku, 1999. 
18 Conversation with an elderly Baku resident, Baku, September 2004. 
19 Conversation with a Baku resident, Baku, August 2007.  
20 Informal interview with a university lecturer, Baku, September 2013.  
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and we had to spend years training them [before they could be of benefit for the factory].’21 He added that 
‘due to high levels of corruption [in universities], many of them [graduates] … either had to pay bribes or 
to use tapsh [to pass subjects] … so in the end they learned nothing’. Nevertheless, many of those 
informants who spend significant parts of their lives living in the USSR agreed that Soviet-era tapsh was 
far more ‘benign’ and ‘amicable’ than present-day informal practices. Many have also believed that 
economic hardships and deterioration of social security––that people were used to and even took for 
granted under communism––during the immediate post-communist period have led to the growing demand 
for tapsh-centred  practices.  
The end of the Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, among other things, has left a serious imprint on both the 
role of tapsh in Azerbaijani society and on the informal practice’s operational specifics. The most obvious 
change occurred in the perception of tapsh. If previously seen as a shameful or disgraceful practice that 
contradicted socialist values, with the collapse of the USSR, tapsh became to be viewed by the population 
as a coping mechanism and a means of overcoming economic challenges of post-communism. A Baku 
resident stated that ‘in communist times, using tapsh was risky, in post-communist period not using tapsh 
became risky [due to the peril of missing opportunities]’22. As well-paid jobs were scarce, the value of 
connections increased and the reliance on tapsh became to be seen as normal and even necessary. The 
socio-economic transformation during the immediate post-communist period also affected operational 
characteristics of tapsh. Instead of preying upon communist command economy, informal practices had to 
adapt to ‘new rules’ of the game dictated by the transition to market economy. This has resulted in steady 
monetisation of tapsh-services. 
The process of commodification of tapsh has been in development over the past twenty five years 
and is still on-going. While the plurality of informants described offering gifts as signs of gratitude for 
tapsh-favours in the 1990s and early 2000s, during more recent periods (from the mid-2000s) the 
informants’ preference shifted towards repaying tapsh-services with cash. The growth of Azerbaijan’s 
economy over the past decade, accompanied by the improvement of living standards, has seemingly 
weakened the custom of gift-giving. One informant explained: ‘I would still give gifts if I deal with older 
                                                 
21 Conversation with a factory administrator, Baku, June 2006.  
22 Conversation with a Baku resident, Baku, September 2005.  
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individuals, but I’d rather give cash to a younger person, because traditions are changing’23. This 
transformation can partly be explained by the generational change and the steady disappearance of the 
Soviet-period tradition of making material gifts in return for informal favours (Patico 2002). Over the past 
two and a half decades, tapsh has also been slowly withdrawing from some sectors of the public sphere 
which it dominated under the Soviet rule and during the 1990s. For instance, tapsh services in healthcare 
have been almost entirely replaced by informal (or formal) payments. The use of tapsh in community 
assistance and in procurement of commodities also becomes more limited than before. Nonetheless, tapsh 
remains omnipresent in its ‘traditional’ areas of control: job market, education, access to public services, 
and circumvention of state bureaucracy.  
 This article limits the scope of its empirical investigation of post-communist tapsh to two public 
sector areas particularly affected by tapsh: higher education and the job market. The research on the use of 
informal practices in post-Soviet education and the labour sector affirms that these two sectors have been 
among the most affected by informal relations areas of the post-Soviet public sphere (Orkodashvili 2010; 
Rodgers & Williams 2009; Rumyantseva 2005). Empirical findings of this study confirm that tapsh 
practices are thriving in the education sector and at the labour market, performing functions similar to blat 
in Russia and Ukraine (Onoshchenko & Williams 2013; Rodgers & Williams 2009), and to krtami in 
Georgia (Aliyev 2014b) or para in Kazakhstan (Werner 2002).   
 
Tapsh in Higher Education 
This section is based on fieldwork observation carried out during the late 1990s and early 2000s among 
graduate students of several major state and private universities in Baku. Some 25–30% of graduate 
students interviewed by the author was from outside of the capital city and came to Baku only for the 
purpose of education. Over 70% of informants were permanent residents of Baku. Most of the data 
presented in this section is derived from unrecorded discussions and participant observation.  
The issue of corruption in Azerbaijan’s system of education has only recently begun emerging in 
academic debates (Lepisto & Kazimzade 2008; Drummond & Gabrscek 2012; Johnson 2004; Sadigov 
                                                 
23 Conversation with a Baku resident, Baku, November 2013.  
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2014). The role of tapsh in higher education has never been previously discussed in academia. Throughout 
the 1990s, tapsh practices were rampant at all levels of higher education in Azerbaijan. In the words of a 
student from a humanities department, ‘you won’t find anyone who studied at a university … and have not 
heard of or used tapsh’24. Given that in post-communist Azerbaijan, similarly to most other post-Soviet 
countries (Onoshchenko & Williams 2013; Morris & Polese 2014), it was nearly impossible to receive a 
university degree without having to pay a bribe at least once, the reliance on tapsh was instrumental in 
circumventing corruption. Although, as observed from this fieldwork, not all university lecturers accepted 
bribes, the majority of instructors working in higher education eagerly engaged in bribe-taking.25  
The mechanism of corruption in institutions of higher education in Azerbaijan does not significantly 
differ from bribery in education sectors of other post-Soviet countries (Morris & Polese 2014). During the 
observed period, bribes were distributed through student mediators who negotiated with lecturers the 
amount that each individual student had to pay. The ‘cost’ of passing exams and tests depended on the 
grade that a student wished to receive and on student’s individual qualities, such as whether the student was 
diligent and attended most of lectures and seminars. Those students who chose to pass exams ‘on their 
own’—without bribes or tapsh—were usually allowed to do so. However, a couple of informants had 
spoken about one or two lecturers in their universities who—regardless of the students’ knowledge of 
subjects—never let their students pass exams without bribes or tapsh. Such cases, however, were seen as 
exceptional.  
The need to pay bribes at the end of each academic semester significantly raised the costs of 
university education and increased the value of tapsh. Therefore, all possible family and friendship 
connections were actively employed by students and their parents in order to obtain good grades without 
having to pay bribes. While the most ‘well-connected’ students relied on ‘protection’ from high-raking 
government officials, the plurality of those who managed to secure tapsh-services at universities gained 
access to lecturers or their superiors through kinship or friendship networks. Once established, such 
                                                 
24 Conversation with a graduate student, Baku, 1999.  
25 With an average monthly salary under US$100 throughout the 1990s and most part of the second post-
communist decade, the majority of university lecturers, as well as teachers in schools and technical institutes, were 
forced to rely on bribery as their main source of income.   
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relationships were carefully maintained through regular gift-giving. The tradition of distributing material 
rewards as a gratitude for tapsh-favours is well-represented in Azerbaijani society. It is also very similar to 
the Russian culture of gift-giving in return for blat-services (Ledeneva 1998; Patico 2002). Due to their 
reliance on tapsh, students avoided paying bribes, but they still were socially sanctioned to reward their 
lecturers with a gift, sometimes a fairly symbolic one, such as a box of chocolate. Notwithstanding the 
costs of such relationships, the use of tapsh markedly alleviated meagre economic conditions of Baku’s 
graduate students.26 Even for students from richer backgrounds, spending money on bribing lecturers was 
perceived as wasteful and irrational. As mentioned by a graduate student from a well-off family, he would 
rather use tapsh—which was not difficult to obtain through his family’s extensive connections—than pay 
bribes, because ‘you can always spend money on something better’. 
Another source of acquiring tapsh by university students was through their private tutors. Since 
most university lecturers were eager to supplement their low state-paid salaries by ‘working on the side’ 
and doing informal and untaxed tutoring for money, those students who happened to take classes taught by 
their private tutors were normally exempted from bribes. This form of tapsh was always reciprocated by 
generous gifts to lecturers. Given that the permanent flow of income through tutoring fees was greater than 
bribes received at the end of each semester (twice per year), most lecturers have valued relations with their 
students and always graded them positively. This formula worked for major subjects, such as the English 
language, mathematics, chemistry and physics. Less ‘lucky’ lecturers of minor subjects—biology, 
literature, physical education and so on—survived almost entirely on bribes and tapsh-related gifts. 
At universities, tapsh was used not only to receive good grades but also, although much less 
commonly, to receive degrees. The practice of employing tapsh-connections to obtain a graduate 
certificate, without attending lectures and passing exams, was particularly widespread among working 
students enrolled in Master (Magistr) or doctoral degrees. While most of those informants who encountered 
these practices admitted that paying a bribe was always an option, it was much easier and financially 
preferable to rely on tapsh. In fact, a number of informants confessed that if they had ‘proper’ tapsh, they 
would prefer working full-time and using tapsh to receive a degree rather than spending their time at a 
                                                 
26 A significant percentage of students were paying tuition fees. Government-provided student scholarships 
amounted to only about US$15 per month, which was insufficient to even cover the cost of public transportation. 
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university without ‘learning much’ and instead ‘wasting’ their money on bribes. A former university 
graduate, interviewed at a later period, said: ‘[e]ssentially it does not matter whether you received your 
degree by actually attending lectures or you bought it … or got it through tapsh … nobody values these 
[university degrees] anyway … all you need to get a decent job is tapsh’27. He added that even graduates 
from prestigious foreign universities are still jobless unless they have tapsh. In point of fact, having a 
university certificate is seen as a formality, commonly ignored by most employers in Azerbaijan. This takes 
us to the next empirical case: the use of tapsh in search for jobs.    
      
Tapsh at the Job Market 
The role of connections at Azerbaijan’s employment market, though neglected in academic studies, is 
observable from representative surveys recently conducted in the country. For example, according to the 
Caucasus Barometer surveys, conducted in Azerbaijan by the Caucasus Research Resource Centre 
(CRRC), over 30% of survey respondents indicated that connections and ‘doing favours to the “right” 
people’ are essential in looking for jobs. Azerbaijanis are well aware about the importance of tapsh in 
search for good jobs. The most common expectation among Azerbaijan’s youth is that their parents will 
take care of finding a decent job for them through their informal networks.28 A similar observation has been 
made by Rogozin (2008, p. 84) in his research on young people in the North Caucasus. A number of 
graduate students claimed that they do not worry about their future employment because their parents have 
all the ‘necessary’ contacts. It has emerged from this fieldwork that only two types of jobs are readily 
available without tapsh. First type is a low paid dead-end jobs, usually given to recent high school and 
university graduates. Long working hours, often without weekend breaks, low salary and little or no 
opportunities for career growth are typical features of jobs—commonly offered by medium-sized local 
companies and firms—that await young people without tapsh-connections. The second type is jobs at 
international companies. However, international employers are looking for experienced and well-trained 
                                                 
27 Conversation with a university graduate, Baku, 2000.  
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professionals and therefore are usually unwilling to employ younger applicants with no work experience. 
As explained by a recent graduate of the prestigious Oil Academy:  
 
I went for interview to BP [British Petroleum] … but since I had no work experience, they did not 
accept me. So, I had to ask my uncle [who owns a small logistics firm] to give me a job. Of course, 
several years later … once I have gained some work experience, I will again try to make my way 
into the oil industry.29 
 
The reliance on tapsh in searching for jobs appears to do more than assisting youth in finding 
decedent employment opportunities; it is also used by employers as a form of pre-modern reference. An 
owner of a small business in Baku’s suburb confessed that he prefers hiring either his relatives and relatives 
of his friends or people recommended to him by his family members, because ‘it is hard to trust strangers’. 
Unlike Western societies where letters of reference and applicant’s educational credentials serve as a 
guarantee of employee’s professional qualities, in Azerbaijan the most reliable source of reference is 
individual’s family and friends. A native of Azerbaijan’s northern region who came to Baku to start his 
own business explained that once he succeeded in opening his retail company—to a certain degree owing 
to the support he received from his family and other natives of his hometown—he invited his relatives and 
friends to work for him. In his words: ‘I never had to look for employees … I have plenty of relatives and 
friends who make the best employees and whom I can always trust’30.  
This shows that tapsh at the employment market is valued and sought after by both job seekers and 
employers. The unwritten rules of tapsh at the job market prescribe that loyalty, determined through the 
strength of tapsh references, is more important than professionalism. As some informants confessed, 
applicants with ‘strong tapsh’ are generally expected to have higher chances of passing job interviews than 
better educated or more professional individuals. While many Azerbaijanis, similar to beneficiaries of 
informal practices in other parts of the world (Ledeneva 1998; Al-Ramahi 2008; Yang 1994), are rather 
uncomfortable to discuss their own experiences of using tapsh in searching for jobs, they, nevertheless, are 
                                                 
29 Conversation with a university graduate, Baku, April 2007.  
30 Conversation with an entrepreneur, Baku, 1998. 
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eager to admit that tapsh-connections are almost always crucial in finding good employment or receiving 
promotion. Although many informants mentioned that they do not want to use tapsh, they also understood 
that given the current reality at the job market, employing tapsh-networks is not a matter of choice but a 
necessity.  
If the practice of using tapsh in searching for jobs in the private sector—due to the absence of formal 
private sector employment under the Soviet rule—is a post-communist phenomenon, the reliance on tapsh 
in finding a job in the public sector is a practice widely employed since the Soviet period. A number of 
informants, observed by this research project, were certain that to get a decently paid government job or a 
civil servant job that promises a constant flow of bribes, one either has to have solid connections or be 
prepared to pay a hefty bribe. A university lecturer, who only recently completed her degree at the same 
department where she currently works, acknowledged that she got her job immediately after graduating 
because her academic supervisor ‘helped’ her. Another informant who works at a ministry confessed that 
he was given the job because his parents ‘helped’ him.  
Unlike the use of tapsh in higher education—seen by many as corrupt and detrimental—relying on 
connections and using tapsh-favours when searching for jobs was understood as normal and even positive 
by many informants. In the words of a recent university graduate: ‘using tapsh to get good grades is wrong, 
because people can study and earn their grades on their own, yet, to use tapsh to find a good job is all right 
if there is no other way of doing it’31. The prevailing public opinion on the ‘positive’ use of tapsh in 
employment sector is often reasoned by rampant unemployment, low salaries and the overall lack of decent 
jobs. The dominant among young people opinion can be summoned in the words of a former university 
student as follows: ‘I would not ask my parents to help me find a job, if I could do it myself … but I can’t 
… so I have no choice’32. For parents, finding a good job for their children is both a moral duty and a 
private safety net. Firstly, in tightly-knit patriarchal families of Azerbaijan’s society, as well as in other 
Caucasian and Central Asian societies, the role of parents is not only limited to raising their kids, but also 
obliges them to take care of their children’s future by finding them ‘good’ spouses and well-paid jobs. For 
instance, Polese et al. (2014, p. 191) illustrate on the example of Uzbek society that ‘parents take care of 
                                                 
31 Conversation with a university graduate, Baku, March 2006.  
32 Conversation with a university graduate, Baku, October 2005. 
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the economic needs of children. After that the young look after the old’. Secondly, in the same way as in 
Central Asia, where ‘[i]t is not uncommon where the state is not providing a sufficient pension for the older 
generations to be supported by their children’ (Polese et al. 2014, p. 190), many parents in Azerbaijan 
perceive their offspring as potential caretakers.  
 
Conclusion 
Thriving primarily in the nation’s capital Baku, the practice of tapsh appears to be deeply engrained in 
social traditions of contemporary Azerbaijan. On theoretical front, this article posited that tapsh belongs to 
a bigger family of informal practices, which commonly share similar characteristics. Similarly to other 
informal practices employed by different societies around the world, tapsh is widely used to receive 
preferential treatment at formal institutions. It is employed to circumvent formal bureaucracy and to gain 
access to public goods and services in short supply. The obligatory and hierarchical nature of tapsh 
relations, as well as their clientelist and nepotistic characteristics, is not unique to tapsh, and is also found 
in other informal practices, such as Arab wasta.  
The main empirical goal of this study was to illustrate how, why and under which circumstances the 
informal practice of tapsh manifests itself in socio-economic and socio-political spheres of post-Soviet 
Azerbaijan. Due to tapsh’s embeddedness in local social culture and family traditions, it has succeeded in 
surviving for generations. While tapsh manifests itself in various areas of public and private spheres, the 
plurality of informants indicated that tapsh is particularly prevalent in higher education and in search for 
jobs. The examples of the use of tapsh in these two areas are manifold and most of Baku’s residents seem 
to have relied on or encountered the use of tapsh when studying at universities and while searching for 
jobs. As seen from practical examples of the use of tapsh in selected areas of private and public sectors, 
demonstrated throughout this article, the popular attitude towards tapsh is neither negative nor positive. 
Most Azerbaijanis rely on it in their daily lives and, (though often resentfully) accept its centrality. The 
widespread reliance on informal practices clearly exacerbates social inequality by limiting access to 
education and employment, as well as to other areas dominated by tapsh practices, in accordance with 
individuals’ ability and means of developing ‘useful’ private networks. Individuals lacking ‘necessary’ 
tapsh connections are faced with the need of either engaging in corrupt practices or accepting the 
 26 
bureaucratic reality. However, the findings of this study reveal that plurality of informants to varying 
degrees had access to tapsh networks developed throughout their lifetime or inherited from their parents. 
The accessibility of tapsh, to a certain degree equalised the majority of population in terms of their ability 
to obtain public goods and legitimises the reliance on tapsh. With the social organisation of Azerbaijan’s 
population heavily based on extended patriarchal family and kinship groups, each member of household 
retains some sort of access to tapsh-services. This makes the custom of tapsh legitimate and socially 
acceptable, thus ensuring its survival and continuity over generations.  
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